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Abstract: This paper presents an examination of the critiques put forward by 
Morton White in his article “Value and Obligation in Dewey and Lewis” (1949), 
particularly those directed upon C. I. Lewis’ conception of normativity and 
valuation. The critic states that Lewis, in offering an account of the normative 
character of ethical judgements, fails to consistently articulate his ethical 
conception with his theory of knowledge. This leads White to conclude that 
the pragmatist has no solution for the fundamental problem of ethics. I will 
argue that such conclusion is wrong. The kernel of my argumentation rests 
in the thesis that White’s criticism stems from an inaccurate interpretation of 
Lewis’ conceptualist pragmatism, one that fails to acknowledge the pragmatic 
apriorism which is the key to a proper understanding of his theory of 
knowledge and to an explanation of the connection and articulation between 
valuation and normativity within Lewis’ framework. In this line, I will show 
that, quite on the contrary, Lewis’ epistemology highlights his ethical and 
normative developments, revealing a naturalistic theory of valuation that is 
the basis upon which normativity pragmatically emerges. I will also maintain 
that this perspective offers a fruitful conception of values and norms which 
has not been sufficiently explored; one that confronts ethical skepticism, that 
can account for the cognitive status of values and norms, and that reclaims 
the rational character of valuation not only for ethics but also for knowledge 
and science.
Keywords: Pragmatism. Clarence Irving Lewis. Morton White. Knowledge. 
Normativity. Valuation.
Resumo: Este artigo apresenta um exame da crítica proposta por Morton 
White em seu artigo “Valor e obrigação em Dewey e Lewis” (1949), em 
particular, àquela voltada para o conceito de normatividade e valoração 
de C.I. Lewis. A crítica afirma que Lewis, ao oferecer um caráter normativo 
dos juízos éticos, malogra ao articular consistentemente a sua concepção 
ética com a sua teoria do conhecimento. Isso leva White a concluir que 
o pragmatista não possui uma solução para o problema fundamental da 
ética. Argumentarei que tal conclusão é equivocada. O núcleo da minha 
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argumentação repousa na tese de que a crítica de White origina-se de uma 
interpretação incorreta do pragmatismo conceitualista de Lewis, falhando 
em reconhecer que o apriorismo pragmático é a chave para o entendimento 
adequado da teoria do conhecimento e para uma explicação da conexão e 
articulação entre valoração e normatividade no interior da abordagem de 
Lewis. Nesta linha, mostrarei que, muito pelo contrário, a epistemologia de 
Lewis destaca os desenvolvimentos éticos e normativos, revelando uma teoria 
naturalística de valoração que é a base na qual a normatividade emerge 
pragmaticamente. Sustentarei, também, que essa perspectiva oferece uma 
concepção profícua de valores e normas que não têm sido suficientemente 
exploradas; algo que confronta o ceticismo ético, podendo levar em conta o 
status cognitivo de valores e normas, e que recupera o caráter racional da 
valoração não apenas para a ética, mas, também, para o conhecimento e 
a ciência.
Palavras-chave: Pragmatismo. Clarence Irving Lewis. Morton White. 
Conhecimento. Normatividade. Valoração.
1 Introduction
This paper examines the critiques put forward by Morton White in his article “Value 
and Obligation in Dewey and Lewis” (1949), particularly those directed upon C. 
I. Lewis’ conception of normativity and valuation.1 The objections were presented 
within the context of an interchange that took place around 1949 between Morton 
White, John Dewey and C. I. Lewis, and whose long development was not fluent 
but rather inconstant and misunderstood. In such exchange of ideas, White not 
only suggested that the pragmatists hold conflicting positions, but also that their 
respective propositions do not succeed in achieving an accurate conception of 
the validity of ethical norms. More specifically, he stated that Lewis, in offering 
an account of the normative character of ethical judgements, fails to consistently 
articulate his ethical conception with his theory of knowledge. This led White to 
the conclusion that the pragmatist has no solution for the fundamental problem 
of ethics. 
To these objections Lewis replied quite immediately in a public lecture entitled 
“Practical and moral imperatives”, which was delivered at Swarthmore College in 
1949. But there is a chance that this response had remained unknown by White, at 
least until its publication in 1969 when, after Lewis’ death, several of his unpublished 
papers were printed under the title Values and Imperatives. Studies in Ethics. Thus 
in 1963, the critic repeated his earlier criticism in the article “Pragmatism and the 
scope of science” (Schlesinger and White 1963). From then on, White and Lewis 
exchanged some letters that never became public, except for a few fragments that 
can be found cited in White’s article “Peirce’s Summum Bonum and the Ethical 
1 For an examination of the debate between Dewey and White over the status of value 
judgments I recommend Robert Sinclair’s article, “Dewey and White on Value, Obligation, 
and Practical Judgment” (2014).
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Views of C. I. Lewis and John Dewey” (WHITE, 1999). However, not even in this 
last paper did the critic take notice of Lewis’ response (WHITE, 1999, p. 1031), even 
though the Lewisian ethical writings were already available.
According to Gouinlock (1978), these criticisms along with others made by 
Stevenson have played an important role in reinforcing the idea, long-time 
sustained, that pragmatism is a defective philosophy. Quite on the contrary, I 
will maintain that Lewis’ pragmatist perspective contains a fruitful and consistent 
conception of norms and values which has not been sufficiently explored and 
that is in fact particularly interesting when considering the problem of the relation 
between values and science, on the one hand, and ethics and science, on the 
other; a conception that allows not only to highlight the role of values in scientific 
practice, but also to delineate a philosophy of knowledge that can provide the 
basis for a critical assessment of those values and norms that guide human action 
and scientific research. I will lend weight to this hypothesis by focusing on the 
analysis of the objections put forward by White with respect to Lewis’ conception 
of valuation and normativity.
In relation to this point, the main argument of Lewis’ theory of valuation—and, 
from my point of view, the heart of his developments on normativity—is the thesis 
that all value judgements are empirical and that valuations represent one type of 
empirical cognition (LEWIS, 1946, p. viii; p. 365, and ff.). According to White, this 
thesis is shared by Dewey as well, except for the fact that Lewis draws a crucial 
distinction between value statements and ethical or normative statements; one that 
Dewey apparently had omitted. In this sense, the critic considers that Lewis takes 
a step forward with respect to Dewey’s position by introducing this analytical 
differentiation. However, he also points out that the distinction itself creates a 
problem within Lewis’ theory of knowledge (WHITE, 1949, p. 321) which leads 
him to conclude that even though Lewis offers a better perspective than Dewey for 
the analysis of ethics, he also fails in giving an accurate and consistent naturalistic 
explanation of obligation (WHITE, 1949, p. 329). I will show that none of these 
claims are precise; that is to say: that Lewis’ analytical distinctive definition of 
value and normative judgments does not conflict with his theory of knowledge, 
on the one hand; and that the pragmatist does offer an explanation of normativity 
which is consistently embedded in a naturalistic and pragmatist theory of values, 
on the other.
In this line, the kernel of my argumentation rests in the thesis that White’s criticism 
stems from an inaccurate interpretation of Lewis’ conceptualist pragmatism, one 
that fails to acknowledge the pragmatic redefinition that the philosopher gives 
to the analytic-synthetic distinction and its correlative, the a priori-a posteriori 
distinction, within his theory of knowledge. I will argue that these analytical 
distinctions embody a relation between the terms that is clearly pragmatic, and that 
this particular understanding of the relation is the key to explain the connection 
between valuation and normativity within Lewis’ framework and to lend weight to 
its potential for current discussions.
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2 Morton White’s criticism
As mentioned before, the inconsistency that White claims to recognize between 
Lewis’ theory of knowledge and his valuation and normative accounts rests ultimately 
in an inappropriate interpretation of his analytic-synthetic distinction. Indeed, White 
begins his argumentation by quoting Lewis: “Valuation is always a matter of empirical 
knowledge. But what is right and just, can never be determined by empirical facts 
alone” (LEWIS, 1946, p. 554). This statement is crucial. Lewis certainly proclaims that 
ethical judgements cannot be determined by empirical facts alone. The question 
to be asked, then, is what other consideration is required in the determination of 
normative judgements? But White seems to overlook this central point—despite 
explicitly acknowledging it (WHITE, 1949, p. 328)—and simply interprets Lewis 
as stating that ethical judgements are not empirical at all. In his words: “Lewis, 
unlike Dewey, makes a distinction between value statements and ethical statements, 
according to which the latter are not empirical” (WHITE, 1949, p. 321; emphasis 
added; cf. also 1949, p. 328). This leads White to conclude that: “In denying that 
ethical statements convey empirical knowledge he [Lewis] joins with those who deny 
to apprehensions of what is right (as distinct from what has value) the character of 
empirical truth or falsity and of empirical knowledge” (WHITE, 1949, p. 328). It is 
worth noticing that the critic reiterated this interpretation in 1999: “[…] he [Lewis] 
believed that statements about what is obligatory, just, or right are not empirical” 
(WHITE, 1999, p. 1030; emphasis added). This clearly shows that White disregards 
the Lewisian developments on theory of valuation and metaethics published in 1969 
that are of paramount importance to this issue, as will be seen below.2 Indeed, I 
will show that White’s conclusion is not appropriate because, quite on the contrary, 
ethical or normative statements are not empirically vacuous in Lewis’ epistemological 
framework. In fact, normative judgements are, according to the pragmatist, those 
value judgements that we know—that is to say, upon which we have a justified 
belief—that constitute the correct or rational manner of action and decision.
White continues his argument by claiming that if Lewis’ affirmation quoted above—
i.e. that what is right and just can never be determined by empirical facts alone—is 
juxtaposed with Lewis’ theory of knowledge, difficulties arise when it comes to 
analyzing ethical knowledge (WHITE, 1949, p. 321, and ff.). Indeed, Lewis sustains 
an epistemological thesis according to which there are only two kinds of knowledge: 
knowledge of analytical propositions and knowledge of empirical propositions. 
Considering this, and according to his interpretation, White argues that since ethical 
judgements are by definition not empirical, then they must be analytical. Therefore, 
his reasoning leads him to believe that Lewis is faced with two equally unacceptable 
conclusions: either all true ethical statement are analytic or ethical propositions are 
not knowledge at all (WHITE, 1949, p. 327-328). This is, from White’s perspective, 
the problem that makes Lewis’ normative proposal a failure. But both of White’s 
conclusions turn out to be quite paradoxical considering that they bring Lewis closer 
2 White does acknowledge Lewis’ The Ground and Nature of the Right (1955), but he 
continues stating that, according to Lewis, normative judgments cannot be established 
empirically (WHITE, 1999, p. 1034–1035).
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to emotivism and non-cognitivism, positions that the pragmatist explicitly rejects in 
several writings (LEWIS, 1946, and 1969).
The analysis above confronts us with an interpretative mistake since, as I will 
argue below, in Lewis’ conceptualist pragmatism all normative statements are to 
be determined considering empirical elements as well as analytical or a priori 
ones. Moreover, the a priori or analytical element must be conceived, in Lewis’ 
framework, neither from a classical empiricist point of view nor from a Kantian 
transcendentalism, but from an original pragmatist perspective that allows analyticity 
to have empirical content and that redefines the a priori as a freely taken attitude 
of mind that regulates the subject’s perception, thought and action; an attitude that 
operates independently of experience, though not of all experience.
3 Reconstructing C. I. Lewis’ response
As stated earlier, White’s conclusions do not hold due to the fact that one of his main 
premises is mistaken. In effect, the key to overcome the epistemological problem that 
White puts forward lies in a careful analysis of Lewis’ understanding and usage of the 
analytic-synthetic distinction. Primarily, it is important to notice that, unlike empirical 
positivism or classical empiricism, for Lewis the distinction between analytic and 
synthetic statements is neither strict nor exclusive, but gradual, modifiable and, most 
importantly, it responds to pragmatic criteria. Therefore, it is not the same conception 
of analyticity that constitutes the target of Quine’s attack in the Two Dogmas of 
empiricism (1951). Indeed, in Lewis’ framework analyticity is not founded on the idea 
of synonymy -which is the core of Quine’s critique—but on the idea of implication or 
containment: analytic statements are those which “assert some relations of meanings 
amongst themselves” and synthetic statements are those which require a relation to 
some particular experience (LEWIS, 1946, p. 17). Furthermore, for Lewis analytic 
judgements can have empirical content, thus the difference with respect to synthetic 
judgements is only gradual and is based on pragmatic grounds. Finally, but not less 
importantly, there is a correlation between, on the one hand, the analytic, the a priori, 
and the conceptual, all of them concepts which explain the subject’s mental activity; 
and on the other, the synthetic, the a posteriori, and the given, all of which account 
for the way the world is presented. But to properly understand the relation between 
the terms, we must consider more carefully Lewis’ conception of the a priori.
The pragmatic apriorism is perhaps Lewis’ most original contribution to 
pragmatism and doubtlessly the core of his conceptualist pragmatism. It constitutes 
the key to a correct understanding of the conceptual dimension of Lewis’ theory of 
knowledge and of the pragmatism that turns such theory into a methodological tool 
that functions transversely in experience, inextricably related to action and valuation 
(SÁNCHEZ GARCÍA, 2015, 2015b, 2016). The pragmatic a priori is the element of 
order, classification, and definition which the human mind brings to experience. In 
Lewis’s words:
The a priori represents an attitude in some sense freely taken, a 
stipulation of the mind itself, and a stipulation which might be 
made in some other way if it suited our bent or need. Such truth is 
necessary as opposed to contingent, not as opposed to voluntary. 
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And the a priori is independent of experience not because it 
prescribes a form which the data of sense must fit, or anticipates 
some preestablished harmony of experience with the mind, but 
precisely because it prescribes nothing to experience. That is a 
priori which is true, no matter what. What it anticipates is not the 
given, but our attitude toward it: it concerns the uncompelled 
initiative of mind or, as Josiah Royce would say, our categorical 
ways of acting. (LEWIS, 1923, p. 169; emphasis in the original).
The a priori element is neither universal, nor fixed or absolute, but multiple and 
subject to alteration on pragmatic grounds. It applies previously and independently 
of present and future particular experience, though it is not independent of all 
experience: “Our categories and definitions are peculiarly social products, reached 
in the light of experiences which have much in common, and beaten out, like other 
pathways, by the coincidence of human purposes and the exigencies of human 
cooperation” (LEWIS, 1923, p. 177). Indeed, it does not imply a divorce from the 
empirical but, rather the opposite, it has a historical and contextual origin, arises 
from past experience and is freely chosen regarding pragmatic reasons (LEWIS, 
1929; 1970; Cf. CALCATERRA, 2009, p. 41-44). In other words, the a priori conveys 
those implicit conceptual principles representing the initiative of mind which are 
chosen on pragmatic grounds and which function normatively legislating on the 
subject’s modes of perceiving, thinking, and acting.
In this frame, the a priori is analytic in the sense that it defines concepts, 
criteria, and classifications, i.e., the meaningfulness of experience: “Mind makes 
classifications and determines meanings; in so doing it creates the a priori 
truth of analytic judgments” (LEWIS, 1923, p. 171). In addition, it is analytic 
in the sense that it functions with necessity and can be maintained in the face 
of experience: “Whenever this is so, the subject concept implies or includes 
the predicate concept and the proposition is a priori because the judgment is 
analytic.” (LEWIS, 1929, p. 294, emphasis in the original). In other words, it is 
the way we use certain concepts or judgements that determines their status as 
a priori or a posteriori, and as analytic or synthetic. In all cases, the distinction 
drawn is neither strict nor absolute, and does not respond to ontological criteria. 
Rather, it is epistemological, and responds to pragmatic criteria (SÁNCHEZ 
GARCÍA, 2015, p. 73, and ff.). In Lewis’ words: “The dividing line between the 
a priori and the a posteriori is that between principles and definitive concepts 
which can be maintained in the face of all experience and those genuinely 
empirical generalizations which might be proven flatly false” (LEWIS, 1970, p. 
238-9; emphasis in the original). In this sense, then, both kind of statements—
analytic and synthetic, a priori and a posteriori—are correlative, have empirical 
implications, are probable and are subject to revision and rejection. Therefore, 
as Cheryl Misak puts forward, it is quite paradoxical that in 1947 when W. O. 
Quine, N. Goodman and M. White were “gearing up for a sustained attack on the 
analytic-synthetic distinction, they identified both Lewis and the logical empiricist 
as their enemies”, a “turning point in the history of pragmatism” that, according to 
Misak, deserves an undertaken study from the sociology of knowledge (MISAK, 
2013, p. 195–6). In this line and despite most of the interpretations that Lewis 
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has received, I agree that it is certainly more accurate to affirm that there is not 
a substantial difference between Lewis’ and Quine’s perspectives on the issue.3 
Moreover, it is possible to think, following Robert Synclair, that:
[…] Lewis had a marked influence on Quine’s dismantling of 
the conceptual-empirical divide in the name of pragmatism, one 
that is obscured by Quine’s remarks but which further indicates 
that Quine and Lewis both share an epistemological perspective 
that remains distinct from Carnap’s own pragmatism. (SINCLAIR, 
2012, p. 350).
In this same vein, Sandra Rosenthal states that:
In a deeply fundamental way, Lewis’s pragmatic reconstruction of 
the a priori undercuts, and can change the nature of, the debates 
about analyticity and the analytic-synthetic distinction, casting 
‘opposing alternatives’ in a new, fruitful, and complementary 
light (ROSENTHAL, 2007, p. 68, emphasis in the original).
From this perspective, White’s interpretation of Lewis’ epistemological 
commitments is incorrect and, therefore, misleading. Consequently, his twofold 
conclusion—that his epistemology comes into conflict with his theory of values and 
that, in this frame, the latter conducts him to non-cognitivism or inconsistency—, do 
not follow. Quite on the contrary, Lewis’ theory of knowledge not only consistently 
explains how normativity is related to valuation within a naturalistic perspective, but 
it also accounts for the validity and foundations of ethics and normativity in general. 
3 This does not mean there aren’t any differences at all between both philosophers. 
For instance, according to Lewis empirical statements are only probable and may 
eventually be proven false, whereas a priori principles remain true: inasmuch as 
they are definitional they can be considered useful or useless, but never strictly 
false. For Quine, however, this distinction is unsustainable insofar as analytic 
claims also have empirical implications through their inferential connection with 
other claims, which is why they are probable too and can be rejected on the same 
basis as empirical statements (SÁNCHEZ GARCÍA, 2015, p. 28). Nevertheless, as I 
explained above, we must take notice that for Lewis analytic statements are such 
due to pragmatic decisions that can eventually change. In this sense, Cheryl Misak 
points out that the “… point of difference lies in the fact that Lewis is a champion 
of intentional logics and concepts, whereas Quine is passionate about a ‘sparse’ 
landscape in which only extensional concepts were allowed. This difference 
might have been what made Quine minimize the similarity between his view and 
Lewis’s” (MISAK, 2013, n. 23). Indeed, we are faced here with an issue that the 
authors themselves did not resolve. The most Lewis had explicitly said about the 
conflicts between him and Quine—once the Two Dogmas was published—comes 
from his notes for “Proseminar Lectures on Practical Philosophy in 1952”: “Neither 
of us, as a fact, grasps with absolute clearness and correctness, the full pattern of 
implications (in my good sense of ‘implications’ not his bad sense) of his own 
conceptions. I take it that if, per impossible, we did, we should come to full 
agreement. But that doesn’t enable us fully to agree now” (Quoted in: MURPHEY, 
2005, p. 328).
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But in order to be able to solidly state this, I must first introduce some key ideas of 
Lewis’ thought.
Lewis maintains that valuations and judgements of rightness—such as, for 
example, ethical judgements—, have usually been classified as “normative” with the 
main purpose of distinguishing them from other types of judgements, traditionally 
called descriptive, empirical or scientific. According to him, this has led to an 
unfortunate confusion that resulted in referring to them indistinctively as “valuations”, 
and to their object as “values”. Against this, he affirms that the distinction between 
them is as important as their relation, and emphasizes the difference explaining that: 
Basically that distinction is simple: ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ apply to 
our decisions and our deliberate doing; ‘good’ and ‘bad’ apply 
to all sorts of things—almost anything you can think of—and are 
not confined to what may be a consequence of action and need 
to be considered in deciding what to do (LEWIS, 1969, p. 33). 
As the author suggests, judgements of value are more general and comprehensive 
and constitute the most primitive mode of judgement. Judgements of rightness, on 
the other hand, are based on the former but are significant only when a deliberate 
decision that requires normative criteria is at stake. In other words, the consequences 
of action can be good or bad, but it is nonetheless pointless to predicate correctness 
upon them; what can be considered correct is the decision to carry out the action 
in order to accomplish its consequences. Another difference that Lewis points out 
is related to the fact that when there is a decision to make, whereas the good 
solicits and is desired, the right commands and is imperative; furthermore, it asks for 
deliberation and justification (LEWIS, 1969, p. 106). In this sense, Lewis shows that 
judgements of rightness are specifically normative. Considering this characterization, 
the pragmatist asserts that:
The problem which delimits the field of ethics is not that of the 
empirically good or valuable but that of the right and morally 
imperative. To be sure, there is essential connection between 
rightness of action and goodness in that which this action is 
intended to effect. At least, it is with this general conception that 
rightness of action derives from value in the end, with which we 
should agree. But just at this point we should be careful that we 
do not illicitly connect the right and the good, before ever we 
have distinguished them. (LEWIS, 1946, p. 552). 
It is important to highlight that Lewis introduces this analytical distinction between 
the good and the correct explicitly acknowledging that it entails a distance from the 
rest of the pragmatists. In “Pragmatism and the roots of the moral” (LEWIS, [1956] 
1969, p. 103-125) he points directly to William James exposing that he confuses 
“good” with “right” (Lewis, 1969, 106), a distinction that John Dewey seems to have 
omitted as well (LEWIS, 1970, p. 76). In this sense, I agree with Browning and 
White when they affirm that Lewis takes a step forward by rightly distinguishing 
questions of ethics from questions of fact about values (BROWNING, 1949, p. 95-96; 
WHITE, 1949, 58:321), but I must dissent from their view when they also suggest 
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that, by doing so, Lewis’ proposal constitutes a departure from pragmatism and, 
furthermore, a failure. In White’s words:
Evidently pragmatism is united on the subject of values but not 
on obligation and justice. Dewey, in spite of a valiant attempt, 
has not given a naturalistic account of obligation, and Lewis 
forsakes the task as impossible. We may say, therefore, that 
pragmatism is without a solution of the fundamental problem of 
ethics (WHITE, 1949, 58:329). 
As far as Browning is concerned, Lewis’ distinction between the right and the 
good, though accurate, represents a heresy to pragmatism and an association with 
transcendentalism, all of which make his position unsuccessful, such as Dewey’s.
To the dominant group of pragmatists this departure [Lewis’] no 
doubt appears as a dangerous innovation, perhaps as a regrettable 
loss of faith in, or even a treasonable break with, the program of 
progressive scientific empiricism. Despite the author’s reiterated 
disclaimers of any truck with transcendentalism, it may be felt 
that he has unplugged an old leak in the dike. (BROWNING, 
1949, p. 95).
Considering this, I will move on to contest this view and show that Lewis’ proposal 
represents no heresy, even less so a transcendentalist perspective. In addition, I will 
argue that it is a hasty conclusion to consider his proposal a failure.
4 Lewis’ “heretical” pragmatism
In “Practical and Moral Imperatives” (1949), Lewis himself accommodates these 
critiques but nevertheless explains that, even though he maintains some distance 
from certain aspects of pragmatism, 
[…] at least I take as my point of departure a thesis which is 
fundamental for pragmatism at large: the thesis namely, that 
there can be no final separation of knowing from doing, of 
theoretical from practical, of cognitive aims from the ends of 
action. Thinking is itself a way of acting, and is indeed that 
manner of acting which is peculiarly human. Furthermore, 
it constitutes the possibility of that deliberateness in acting 
by reason of which human behavior may be self-critical and 
responsible. (LEWIS, 1969, p. 127).
Having stated this, the philosopher argues that accepting that thinking does 
have its principles of rightness (logical imperatives) and, at the same time, refusing to 
recognize that there are valid principles which determine the correct mode of action 
(ethical imperatives), represents a position that pragmatism as a whole would reject 
from the start, since for pragmatism there is no separation between knowledge and 
action: without action, knowledge is useless and pointless; and without knowledge, 
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action is blind; in fact, it is quite impossible. Knowledge is itself a mode of action and 
is also a normative category: what is established as true is what ought to be believed 
and, if we deliberately and rationally decide it so, it is what ought to be acted on 
(LEWIS, 1946, p. 371-2; 1969, p. 128, and ff.). Thus, normativity permeates the whole 
of our experience, though in different degrees. This leads to conclude that rejecting 
the validity of normative principles for action implies rejecting the validity of all 
normative principles that regulate and legitimate the process and results of scientific 
investigation, a consequence that those who are skeptic with respect to ethics and 
values are not willing to accept. In this respect, Lewis calls for special attention in 
considering a new and sophisticated contemporary skepticism in ethics. According to 
the pragmatist, this contemporary skepticism maintains a cynical attitude towards the 
ethical, the moral and the valuational validities using the same arguments that Hume 
brandished towards the validity of knowledge and normativity at large, but curiously 
omitting to extend them beyond the scope of the validity of science. In his words:
It is a curious and dreadful fact that just at the time when science 
has put into the hands of men the most powerful instruments 
for control of their environment—ambivalently capable of use 
for human betterment or for the suicide of civilization—we 
should be told, by some of those who celebrate science as the 
outstanding triumph of the human mind, that appraisals of the 
good and bad and assessments of the right and wrong have 
nothing more fundamental as their basis and their sanction than 
our emotive drives and our subjective persuasions of attitude. 
(LEWIS, 1969, p. 20).
As the author puts forward, rejecting the rational character of ethics and 
valuation simultaneously entails rejecting the rational character of knowledge, 
science and logic. Moreover, it involves denying the rationality of every single mode 
of action, hence turning the subject into a pervert and fool being. Against this, 
he reclaims and affirms the rational dimension of values and valuation in human 
experience showing that, closely related to valuation, founded in our best judgements 
of values, emerges the normative dimension that makes all human actions and 
decisions significant. This will be properly developed right below, but I would like 
to anticipate that what is most interesting is that this articulation between values 
and norms, between the good and the right, between valuation and normativity, is 
clearly pragmatic and is embedded in a conception of rationality that is, doubtlessly, 
pragmatist. In this sense, the interpretations that understand the Lewisian proposal 
as a departure from pragmatism and, moreover, as one that is in close relation to 
analytic or transcendentalist positions, fail precisely in omitting the basic premises 
that give sense to the philosopher’s stance, decontextualizing the main thesis of his 
conceptualist pragmatism. Lewis himself recognizes this and adds that it is exactly 
this point that the critics have disregarded: 
I think my critics must somehow have overlooked this basic 
thesis of pragmatism. Otherwise they could hardly have been 
so mystified over the question how a pragmatic theory of 
knowledge could be made consistent with the recognition of 
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valid imperatives of action. They might better have asked how 
pragmatism in epistemology could be compatible with anything 
else (LEWIS, 1969, p. 128).
Lewis’ perspective is neither internally inconsistent nor constitutes a heresy to 
pragmatism. On the contrary, it helps to clarify and understand how a naturalistic 
theory of value can be articulated with a universalistic theory of normativity within 
a pragmatist framework of rationality, thus reconfiguring the way philosophy has 
traditionally conceived the relations between valuation, normativity and rationality. 
I will develop these points in the section below.
5 Revisiting Lewis’ conceptualist pragmatism
In Lewis’ perspective the idea of the desirable/ought to be desired is not logically 
derived from the idea of the desired. There is no such logical entailment, therefore, 
the naturalistic fallacy does not take place. But there is, as I said before, an essential 
connection between them: the right emerges from the good (LEWIS, 1946, p. 552, 
1957, p. 78-79). In this sense, valuation is the necessary and preceding condition of 
normativity. The overall question of the foundation of the right rests in a naturalistic 
theory of value which is conceived as a type of empirical knowledge that, by 
definition, is justified; that is, is rationally accepted (LEWIS, 1946, p. 407).
The crucial point that is introduced by Lewis’ conceptualist pragmatism is 
that, eventually, these valid judgements of value can start working as normative 
judgements (ethical, logical, epistemological) if we pragmatically decide it so. Thus, 
this kind of statements become analytical in the sense that they define what we 
mean by the right mode of thinking, acting or believing; they become a priori, 
operating previously and independently of particular experiences (but not of every 
experience), and determining our action according to the rational mode. And this 
conversion responds to pragmatic criteria. When this is the case, we are faced with 
rational imperatives, which are nothing but our best value judgments formalized as 
normative judgments. In other words, the normative character emerges, not from 
a rational intuition of an absolute axiology, but from a pragmatic decision to guide 
our action according to what we rationally consider is the most intelligent advice, 
the best counsel for action, in brief, the rationally correct mode of behavior in order 
to accomplish certain goals. 
If, then, I look to a pragmatic basis of the normative, it is to a 
pragmatism which turns upon the right, and only indirectly upon 
the good. And perhaps it comes as near to what is pragmatic in 
Kant and what Royce called his ‘absolute pragmatism’ as it does 
to James or Dewey -or even Peirce (LEWIS, 1969, p. 107). 
This is why for Lewis a purely empirical analysis of the ethical, the right or the 
normative is impossible, since it also requires the analysis of what we intentionally 
mean by the right. Again, imperative or normative judgements are analytical in 
the sense that they formally express the criteria and the nature of the right. Thus, 
according to Lewis, an adequate theory of obligation must be directed to experience 
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as well as to the concepts and principles that contain and express the nature and 
definition of the right, and indirectly, of the good; in other words, it requires a 
naturalistic explanation of values and the modes of valuations, on the one hand, and 
a conceptual analysis of the pragmatic apriorism that guide our modes of behavior, 
on the other. In this sense, I agree together with E. B. Dayton when he affirms that 
“ […] Lewis’ imperatives provide only the form within which empirical valuings are 
applied to decisions, so what is morally right is in the final analysis a matter of (both 
logic and) human nature.” (DAYTON, 1975, p. 301).
5 Conclusion
I have discussed White’s criticisms of Lewis’ conception of value and normative 
judgements and argued that those criticisms were based on a number of 
misinterpretations of some of the pragmatist’s ideas. I have shown that White’s 
understanding of Lewis’ theory of knowledge mystified certain pragmatic 
resignifications concerning the analytic-synthetic distinction, on the one hand, and 
overlooked the central role that the pragmatic a priori plays in Lewis developments, 
on the other. I believe this may have conducted White to state that Lewis fails in 
giving an accurate and consistent naturalistic explanation of obligation. 
To account for this position, I have attempted to demonstrate that Lewis’ analytical 
distinction between the good and the right does not conflict with his theory of 
knowledge, since normative judgements are not analytical in the sense of analyticity 
that is implied in Quine’s dismantling of the analytic-synthetic distinction. On the 
contrary, normative judgements are propositions of value that do have empirical 
content but that function a priori, as analytical or defining of the correct mode of 
action. In this sense, Lewis’ ethical developments do not conflict with his theory 
of knowledge; quite the opposite, his epistemology highlights his normative 
developments revealing a naturalistic theory of valuation that is the basis upon 
which normativity pragmatically emerges.
I have argued, as well, that Lewis’ proposal is built upon a set of theses that are basically 
pragmatist: the idea that values are facts and that value judgements are propositions 
that can be justified and empirically determined; a conception of valuation as a 
pervasive dimension of experience; the rejection of the drastic separation between 
knowledge and action; the recognition of rationality for ethics and valuation, among 
others. Lewis himself acknowledges that his developments concerning valuation and 
ethics are rooted in theses which are fundamental for pragmatism at large (LEWIS, 
1969, p. 127), and that having overlooked those fundamental premises was what 
misled his critics (particularly White) to affirm an inconsistency between a pragmatist 
theory of knowledge and a theory of value and obligation.
Finally, these conclusions lay support to the thesis that Lewis indeed presents an 
interesting and promising conception of normativity that is embedded in a naturalistic 
theory of valuation that can account for the cognitive character of values and norms, 
without having to give up universalistic pretensions; an original pragmatist position 
that faces ethical skepticism reclaiming the role, significance and validity of values 
and norms, showing that rejecting the rational character of ethics and valuation 
simultaneously entails rejecting the rational character of every mode of action, 
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including knowledge, science and logic. This justifies and demands further research 
focused on the hypothesis that Lewis’ theory of valuation and normativity has the 
potential to account for the main issues concerning the recent debates regarding 
the relation between norms and values, namely: the conception and epistemic 
status of values and norms; the validity conditions of scientific, value and normative 
judgments; the incidence of disagreement and value pluralism in the cognitive status 
of values and in the universality of norms; and the definition and applicability 
of the conception of rationality, among others (PUTNAM et al., 2008); all of the 
issues which, on the other hand, stem from certain assumptions that, according to 
Joseph Margolis, still remain insufficiently explained within pragmatism: “[…] the 
correct account of the relationship between naturalism and pragmatism […] [and] 
the conceptual relationship between the distinctive rigor of ‘reason’ (or ‘thought’) 
and the continuum of “experience’” (MARGOLIS, 2013, p. 108). I hypothesize that 
Lewis can offer a serious and fruitful response to these questions; one that can also 
overcome the limitations of a reductionist naturalism (in both metaphysical and 
methodological terms), on the one hand, and avoid the risks of a dichotomization 
between values and norms, on the other; both consequences that could lead to a 
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